We study the general problem of a principal who desires to implement a given vector of actions and pay the agents according to a given compensation scheme. Previous work has provided mechanisms for implementation in various special cases. In this paper we fully characterize the set of action proflles and compensation schemes implementable in sub game perfect equilibrium, providing necessary and sufficient conditions for implementation.
Introduction
In the traditional implementation problem with complete information there is a set of possible states of the world S, with typical element s, a set of possible decisions D and a social choice function (or correspondence) f : S -t D that the planner wants to implement. The state of the world s is observed by N agents, who have utilities defined over S x D, but not by the planner. The problem is therefore to set up a mechanism making sure that the agents report truthfully the state of the world they observe. The presence of complete information makes incentive considerations trivial, since no agent has truly private information. It is therefore easy to set up a mechanism delivering truthtelling as an equilibrium (in fact, by the revelation principle the direct mechanism suffices). The difficult part is to make sure that truthtelling is the unique equilibrium, or more precisely to make sure that f (8) is the unique equilibrium outcome when the state of the world is s.
'Vhether or not is actually possible to design a mechanism delivering unique implementation depends on the properties of f and on the equilibrium notion adopted to predict the outcome of the mechanism. The literature has provided complete characterizations of the set of implementable social choice functions for an array of solution concepts, such as Nash 1 equilibrium (Moore and Repullo (1990) and Dutta and Sen (1991) ), subgame perfect equilibrium (Moore and Repullo (1988) and Abreu and Sen (1990) ) and virtual implementation with iterative elimination of dominated strategies (Abreu and Matsushima (1992) ). The traditional problem described above can be seen as an 'adverse selection', or 'hidden information' problem. In this paper we look at the 'moral hazard' or 'hidden action' counterpart. The problem can be described 8..<; follows. Let I be a finite set of agents. Each agent i
can take an action ai in the finite set A. Let 
aI). The action profile
a determines a probability distribution over some real-valued variable (the typical example is the revenue of a firm) v. Let V a be the finite set of values which can be taken by v when the true action profile is a, and let P ('Ia) be the probability distribution of v when the true action profile is a. Define V = UaEA V
a .
An individual compensation scheme for agent i is a function Wi : V -R, i.e. Wi specifies a monetary transfer for each possible realization of v. A compensation scheme W is just a collection of individual compensation schemes, i.e. W = (Wl, ... , W I)' Each agent has preferences over actions and individual compensation schemes represented by a utility function of the form:
Ui(a, Wi) = L p(vla)ui[a, Wi(V)] vEV
where the "basic" utility function u i : A x R -R, is defined over the whole action profile a and the monetary transfer, and the probability distribution p(.) is common to all players.
The goal of the planner is to make sme that each agent takes a given action ai, so that the action profile a* = (ai, . .. ,aj) is collecti\'ely taken, and reward each agent with compensation scheme wi when a* is the true action profile. Defining w* = (wi, ... , wj), we will refer to this as 'the problem of implementing the pair (a*,w*)'. A well known example is the case of a risk neutral employer with risk averse agents who desires to implement the action profile a* maximizing expected revenue and pay a constant wage to each agentl (i.e. for each i there is a real number Wi such that wi (v) = Wi for each v).
The 'complete information' assumption in this model takes the form that each agent can observe the whole action profile a. This again eliminates incentive considerations, since an agent can be forced to take ai simply because any different action could be reported to the principal, and a stiff fine could follow. It leaves however open the multiplicity problem.
Such a problem was first considered by Demski and Sappington (1984) and Mookherjee (1984) . They observed that standard 'tournament' models usually have multiple equilibria, and some of the 'bad' equilibria may be Pareto-superior from agents' point of view. In particular, in 'direct revelation' types of mechanisms it is often an equilibrium for all the agents to take the lowest level of effort and report unanimously that the required effort was actually undertaken. Ma, Moore and Thrnbull (1988) have shown how to get unique implementation in the DemskiSappington model, and Ma (1988) has shown that unique implementation in subgame perfect equilibrium is achievable in the MOQkherjee model. A number of recent contributions, among them Arya and Glover (1995) , Sjostrom (1996), Arya, Glover and Hughes (1997) and Brusco ISee Ma (1988) for an analysis of this case.
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(1997) have all proposed mechanism for implementation in some variant of the general model. The main goal of these papers is to provide mechanisms to solve a given implementation problem. Obviously, the simpler the mechanism the better it is. In other words, the above cited papers only look at sufficient conditions for implementation.
In this paper we take a different perspective, which is more related to the classical implementation perspective. The question we want to answer is: Can we identify necessary and sufficient conditions that a pair (a*, w*) has to satisfy in order to be implementable? We consider subgame perfect equilibrium as the solution concept, and provide such conditions. Since the goal is only to provide a full characterization of implementable pairs (a*, w*), identifying exactly the class of implement able pairs, we do not try to use simple mechanisms in our proof. While the mechanism adopted for the general proof is complicated and incorporates the undesirable 'integer game' feature, it is clear that in many (not so special) cases simpler mechanism are available, as shown by the papers cited above.
The rest of the paper is organized a<; follows. In section 2 we provide a discussion of the problem of implementing action profiles and state the result about necessary conditions. In section 3 we show that, when there are at least three agents, the necessary conditions are also sufficient, and describe a general mechanism for implementation. Section 4 contains concluding remarks. The proofs are collected in the appendix.
Necessary Conditions
There are two main differences between the traditional implementation problem and the problem of implementing action profiles. First, agents will report on an endogenous variable (the action profile) rather than on some exogenously given state of the world.
Second, 'action taking' is given by some technological process and it cannot be manipulated by the principal. This imposes some physiological constraints on the form that the mechanism can take. In particular, any extensive game which is adopted to implement the pair (a*, w*) must be made up of 3 parts:
1. A 'pre-action part', where agents send messages. This has to be intended as an extensive form at which messages are exchanged, with the final vector of messages observed by the principal and the agents. Depending on the message profile, either the game ends and payments are determined, or the game proceeds to the action stage.
2. An 'action part' where each agent chooses an action, possibly as a function of the outcome of the pre-action stage. Simultaneously, the agent can also issue some message 2 • The set of messages available to the agents may depend on the message profile announced at the pre-action stage. The action profile is observed by the agents but not by the principal, while the message profile issued at this stage is also observed by the principal.
3. A 'post-action part' where messages are again issued. The particular extensive form used may depend on the messages sent at the pre-action stage and at the action stage.
However, it cannot depend on the action profile a, since this is not observable by the principal.
The final vector of messages (i.e. messages issued at each stage) determines the compensation scheme selected by the principal, while the action profile implemented is simply the one chosen by the agents at the action stage. The search for necessary conditions for implementation has to take into account this natural structure of any mechanism. In order to understand better what type of conditions we may need, it is useful to think about the necessary conditions in the 'standard' (Le., hidden information) implementation problem. The basic idea is that if the social choice function prescribes two different allocations at state s and at state s' we want to avoid that the strategy profile adopted at s be an equilibrium when the state of the world is s'. When implementing action profiles, the main issue becomes to make sure that an action profile a =1= a* is not taken in equilibrium. In particular, we want to avoid equilibria in which a =1= a* is the action profile taken and the agents issue the same messages as in the equilibrium in which a* is taken, thus leading to the selection of the compensation scheme w*. In other words, whenever an action profile a =1= a* is going to be taken there must be a profitable deviation for some agent at some stage of the mechanism. As observed before, all mechanisms for implementation of action profiles can be partitioned in three parts, and we are going now to provide three conditions, each one corresponding to the case in which a profitable deviation can be found at a given part.
First, we have a condition making possible a deviation in the post-action part. Condition 1 permits to 'test' independently a claim made by an agent that the true action profile is a rather than a*. This structure is used for example by Ma (1988) . Brusco (1997) discusses the relationship between condition 1 and Abreu and Sen's condition et, a necessary condition for sub game perfect implementation in the 'adverse selection' framework. Second, we have the condition making possible a deviation at the action part. Proof. See Appendix .
• The union of conditions 1-3 is therefore a necessary condition for implementation of a pair (a*, w*). The role played by such condition is therefore analogous to the role played by ?vlaskin monotonicity for Nash implementation or by condition a (see Abreu and Sen (1990) ) for sllbgame perfect implementation. To complete the analogy, we have to show that the condition is also sufficient when there are at least three agents. This is done in the next section.
and U i (a, -E) < U i (a,wi (v)) for each agent i, for each v and for each compensation scheme w entering in one of conditions 1-3. In other words, it is always possible to 'reward enough' and 'punish enough' an agent.
Theorem 2 Suppose that each action profile a =I a* satisfies one of conditions 1, 2 or 3.
If there are at least 3 agents then the pair (a*, w*) can be implemented in subgame perfect equilibrium.
In the remainingofthis section we describe the mechanism for implementation. In the appendix we show that there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium yielding (a*, w*) and that no subgame perfect equilibrium has an outcome other than (a*w*).
Define Al as the set of action profiles that satisfy condition 1 with respect to a*, A2 the set of actions such that a (j. Al and Condition 2 is satisfied with respect to (a*,w*) , and A3 the set of actions such that a (j. A I U A 2 and condition 3 is satisfied with respect to (a*, w*) .
The pre-action stage
Each agent announces an action profile a E A and an integer number. The outcome function is as follows.
• N - • In all other cases the agent announcing the highest integer receives a large sum K , all other agents receive -E and the game ends. Ties are broken in favor of the lower index (this tie-breaking rule is used in all the following stages).
The action stage
Let (a, w) be the standing message. Each agent i takes an action and announces an action profile a E A and an integer number. The outcome function is as follows:
• N -1 agents announce (a, 0), the remaining agent announces (a,·) . Go to the post-action stage with the standing message unchanged.
• N -1 agents announce (a,O), agent i announces (a,.). Go to the post-action stage defining the standing message as follows:
-Suppose that a satisfies condition 2 with respect to (a, w) and i = i (a, a), i.e. i is the agent identified by the condition. In this case let ai = ai (a, a) and wy = wy (a, a)
be the action and the individual compensation scheme identified by the condition.
The standing message becomes ((ai, a-i), (wy, w-d).
6 -Otherwise the standing message remains (a, w) .
• In all other cases the agent announcing the highest integer receives a large sum K , all other agents receive -E and the game ends.
The post-action stage Each agent announces a E A and an integer number. The outcome function differs depending on the standing message. Case 1. The standing message is (a*, w*) .
• N -1 agents announce (a,O) , the remaining agent i announces (a,·) such that either a does not satisfy condition 1 with respect to a or i = j (a, a), i.e. i is the agent identified by the condition. In this case:
-If a = a* then pay the agents according to w*.
-If a =I-a* then all agents are paid -~E except the agent who announced the highest integer at the action stage, who is paid -E.
• N -1 agents announce (a,O) , the remaining agent i announces (a,·) that satisfies condition 1 with respect to a and sllch that i =I-j Ca, a). In this case go to the substage r (a, a).
• In all other cases the agent announcing the highest integer receives a large sum K , all other agents receive -E and the game ends Case 2. The standing message is Ca, w) -=1= (a*, w*).
• N -1 agents announce (a, 0) , the remaining agent i announces (a, -) such that either a does not satisfy condition 1 with respect to a or i = j (a, a). In this case:
-If a does not satisfy condition 1 with respect to a then pay the agents according to w (here a and ware given by the standing message).
-If a satisfies condition 1 with respect to a then all agents are paid -~E except the agent who announced the highest integer at the action stage, who is paid -E.
• N -1 agents announce (a, 0), the remaining agent i announces (a, .) that satisfies condition 1 with respect to a and such that i =I-j (a, a). In this case go to the substage r (a, a).
• In all other cases the agent annollncing the highest integer receives a large sum K, all other agents receive -E and th~ game ends.
The substage r (a, a). Let j be the agent and (wj, w}) the two compensation schemes identified by condition 1. Each agent announces either Y or N and an integer number. The outcome function is as follows.
• If N -1 agents announce (Y,O) and agent j announces (Y,') then each agent is paid -2E
and j is paid wj.
• If N -1 agents announce (Y, 0) and agent j announces (N,·) then each agent is paid -2E
and j is paid wJ.
• If at least N -1 agents announce (N,O) then agent i (the agent who 'disagreed' at the post-action stage)) is paid a large sum K and all other agents are paid -2E.
• In all other cases the agent annollllcing the highest integer receives a large sum K , all other agents receive -2E and the game ends. Ties are broken in favor of the lower index.
The basic idea of the mechanism is to make sure that in all equilibria the agents repeatedly confirm that the action profile a* is taken. The structure of the mechanism makes then sure that no action profile a =1= a* can be taken when such a sequence of messages is issued. This is done by exploiting conditions 1-3 to make sure that whenever a =1= a* is taken in equilibrium some agent has a profitable deviation at some point. 4 Conclusion \Ve have provided necessary and sufficient conditions for the implementation of an action profile a* and a vector of compensation schemes w*, thus obtaining a full characterization of the implementable pairs (a*, w*). This constitutes the natural counterpart of the necessary and sufficient condition for implementation in the traditional ('hidden information') implementation framework. The 'hidden action' case presents some interesting differences with respect to the tradition case. We have shown that mechanisms implementing action profiles have a natural sequential structure centered on the 'action taking' stage, and that necessary and sufficient conditions can be obtained looking at some 'reversal of preferences' in different parts of the mechanism. Previous work has been more 'ad hoc' in the sense that special pairs (a*, w*) were considered and a mechanism for implementation was found. In general, these mechanism rely on some reversal of preferences at what we have called 'post-action stage'. We have shown that in fact implementation may be possible under more general conditions, involving reversal of preferences at the 'action stage' or at the 'pre-action stage'.
Suppose that there exists an extensive form mechanism implementing (a*, w*) in subgame perfect equilibrium. A formal description of an extensive form mechanism is beyond the scope of this paper, and we simply refer to Selten (1975) . Here we will introduce only the notation which is helpful in understanding the proof. Let us define 9 as the outcome function of the extensive form game. Therefore, 9 maps each action profile and each sequence of messages observed into the same action profile and a vector of compensation schemes. We will denote by M the set of all possible sequences of messages that can be observed, Ml the set of possible sequences of messages that can be observed before the action stage, Ma the set of possible messages that can be observed at the action stage and M2 the set of possible sequences of messages that can be observed at the post-action stage. Thus 9 (a, m) = (a, w) , with m EM. For a given action profile a and messages ml E Ml, ma E Ma we define M2 (ml' ma) as the set of message profiles observable at the post-action stage and 92 (m21 (ml' ma)) as the outcome function for this subgame. Notice that the outcome function is independent of a since this is not observable by the planner. However, a is observed by the players, so that they can condition their strategies on a.
A strategy profile (Y describes the bcltavior taken by the agents at each information set. A given (Y yields a sequence of messages rn E M and an action profile. In turn, the sequence of messages yields through 9 a compensation scheme.
Since the mechanism implements (a*, w*), there exists a strategy profile (Y* yielding this outcome. Let us call mi the vector of messages sent at the pre-action stage when agents follow (Y*. Since the strategy profile yields (a*, w*) we have that (Y* yields the pair (a*, m~) at the action stage (that is, following mi the action profile a* is taken and a message m~ is issued) and a message profile m2 at the post action stage when (mi, a*, m~) have been observed. Then 92 (m;1 (mi, m~)) = w*, that is when messages mi, m~ and m; are issued the selected compensation scheme is w*.
Without loss of generality, assume that if at some subgame a unilateral deviation is observed then the worst possible subgame perfect equilibrium for the deviator is selected.
Vve now show that if there is an action profile a f= a* that satisfies none of conditions 1,2 and 3 then there exists a sub game perfect equilibrium yielding (a, w*), a contradiction.
Consider such an action profile a and the following strategy profile:
• At the pre-action stage each agent follows strategy (Yii.
• If mi is observed after the pre-action stage then each agent takes action ai (rather than an and issues message m~i (that is, the same message as in the truthtelling equilibrium).
In all other cases behave as in the original equilibrium.
• At the post-action stage, use strategy (Y~ (mi, a* ,m~) if (mi, m~, a) has been observed.
In all other cases, behave as in the original equilibrium. In other words, whenever all agents take the actions prescribed in action profile a and issue the message (mi, m~i) then behave as if the observed q,ction profile were a*. Otherwise, behave as in the original equilibrium.
This strategy profile results in the action profile a and a sequence of messages (mi, m~, m2) . Since this is the message observed in the 'right' equilibrium, the compensation scheme w* is selected. Therefore, the overall outcome is (a, w*) f= (a*, w*), and the strategy profile cannot be a subgame perfect equilibrium. We now prove that if a does not satisfy 1,2 or 3 then this is in fact a subgame perfect equilibrium, a contradiction.
Suppose not. Then, at some subgame, a profitable deviation exists. Given the definition of the strategy profile we observe that:
• no deviation is possible in subgames following ml f= mij
• no deviation is possible in subgames following (mi, ma) if there is an agent i such that mi ...J. m i *. a r a '
• no deviation is possible after observing an action profile a f= a.
The reason is that in all those subgames exactly the original equilibrium strategy is followed. Deviations can therefore occur:
1. At the post-action stage in some su bgame following (mi, m~, a) j 2. At the action stage following a message mi.
3. At the pre-action stage.
Suppose first that the deviation occurs at a subgame following the sequence of messages and actions (mi, m~, a), and let us call j the agent with a profitable deviation. Suppose that by following strategy O"~ (mi, m~, a*) the outcome is W X (notice that the subgame need not be reached in equilibrium), and that a deviation by agent i yields a compensation scheme w Y • Since the deviation is profitable we have U j ( a, wJ) > uj (a, wj). On the other hand, the same deviation is not profitable in the original equilibrium, so that uj (a*, wj) ~ U j (a*, wJ) .
The implication is that condition 1 is satisfied. Since we assumed the contrary, no profitable deviation exists in subgames following (mi, m~, a). We are therefore assured that the strategy profile is a subgame perfect equilibrium for each subgame at the post-action stage. More in general, observe that whenever action profile a does not satisfy condition 1 with respect to another action profile a' then the set of subgame perfect equilibrium following (ml, a, ma) is identical to the set of equilibria following (ml' a', ma) . We will use repeatedly this observation later. Suppose next that a profitable deviation is available at the action stage. We show that in this case condition 2 must be satisfied, generating a contradiction. The existence of a profitable deviation implies that there exists an agent i, an action ai f= ai and a message m~ such that the agent is better off taking the action ai, issuing the message m~ and then obtaining the resulting compensation scheme. Following a deviation ai, the observed action profile is (ai, a-i). Let m2 = 0"2 (mi, (m~,m~-i), (ai, a-i) ) and w Y = 9 (mi, (m~,m~~i) ,m2)' Then the profitability of the deviation implies: , w;) that is, part 1 of condition 2 is satisfied. To see that part 2 is also satisfied, suppose that there exists an action ai such that (ai, a~i) does not satisfy condition 1 with respect to (ai, a-i) .
The implication is that the set of subgame perfect equilibria following a given set of messages (ml' ma) must be the same. Now recall that wf has been taken to be the worst subgame perfect equilibrium outcome for agent i. If U i ((ai, a~i) ,wY) > U i (a* , wi) then agent i has a profitable deviation in the right equilibrium, namely take action ai and issue message m~ at the message stage. We conclude that for every action ai,
or (ai,a~i) satisfies condition 1 with respect to (ai, a-i).
At last, a profitable deviation may be available only at the pre-action stage. Again, we show that in this case condition 3 has to be satisfied, a contradiction.
Let ml be the message resulting at the pre-action stage as a consequence of a profitable deviation by agent i (other agents may send messages other than in the right equilibrium because there may be substages at the pre-action stage, and agents may react to an out of equilibrium announcement). As a consequence of message ml the action profile a and the message profile ma results at the action stage, and the message m2 = (J2 (ml' ma, a) is issued at the post-action stage. These are the same action profiles and messages sent in the right equilibrium. Define w Y = 9 (ml, ma, m '2) 
(N,O).
We now check, working backward, that this is a subgame perfect equilibrium.
At r (a, a) the only agent who can change the outcome is j. It is clear that the prescribed strategy is optimal.
At the post-action stage an agent i can deviate announcing a false action profile a that satisfies condition 1 with respect to the action profile and such that j (a, a) i-i. Since the other agents are announcing the true action profile, the equilibrium at r (a, a) is that everybody announces (Y, 0), making the deviant agent worse off.
Consider now the action stage. Suppose first that the standing message is (a*, w*). Taking an action ai i-ai and announcing (a*,·) is clearly not profitable since, given the equilibrium at the post-action stage, it yields at most -E, Taking action ai and issuing message (a,,), At last, no deviation at the pre-action stage is profitable, by part 2 of condition 3.
• Lemma 2 There is no subgame perfect equilibrium with an outcome other than (a, w*) .
Proof. All equilibria must have the following structure:
• All agents announce (a*, 0) at "the pre-action stage .
• If (a, w) is the standing message at the action stage then all agents announce (a, 0) .
• When the action profile is a has been taken then all agents announce unanimously an action profile a at the post action stage such that a does not satisfy condition 1 with respect to a.
• Whenever a given message is issued with positive probability at the action stage, it is confirmed at the post-action stage. If not, the integer game would be triggered at the action stage.
• If a substage r (a, a) is reached and agent j (a, a) strictly prefers w; (a, a) to wj (a, a) then the only equilibrium is that all agents announce (N,O).
The implication is that in all equilibria the action stage is reached with probability 1 with standing message (a*, w*), the announcement is confirmed at the action stage ans then again at the post action stage. We have only to show that, when this sequence of messages occurs, no action profile a =1= a* can be part of an equilibrium.
Suppose that there is an equilibrium in which at the action stage the agents take an action profile a =1= a*. It can never be the case t hat action a satisfies condition 1 with respect to a*.
The reason is that at the post action st age one agent could announce the true action profile, thus reaching r (a, a) and obtaining K. 
